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STRATEGIC INFORMATION  TRANSMISSION 
BY VINCENT P.  CRAWFORD AND JOEL SOBELI 
"Oh, what a tangled web we weave, when first we practice to deceive!" 
-Sir  Walter Scott 
This paper develops a model  of  strategic communication,  in which a better-informed 
Sender (S)  sends a possibly noisy signal to a Receiver (R),  who then takes an action that 
determines the welfare of both. We characterize the set of Bayesian Nash equilibria under 
standard assumptions, and show that equilibrium signaling always takes a strikingly simple 
form, in which S partitions the support of the (scalar) variable that represents his private 
information and introduces noise into his signal by reporting, in effect, only which element 
of the partition his observation actually lies in. We show under further assumptions that 
before S observes his private information, the equilibrium whose partition has the greatest 
number of elements is Pareto-superior to all other equilibria, and that if agents coordinate 
on this equilibrium, R's equilibrium expected utility rises when agents' preferences become 
more similar. Since R bases his choice of action on rational expectations, this establishes a 
sense in which equilibrium signaling is more informative when agents' preferences are more 
similar. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
MANY  OF THE DIFFICULTIES ASSOCIATED with reaching agreements are informa- 
tional.  Bargainers typically  have  different information  about  preferences and 
even about what is feasible. Sharing information makes available better potential 
agreements, but it also has strategic effects that make one suspect that revealing 
all to an opponent is not usually the most advantageous policy. Nevertheless, it 
seems clear that even  a  completely  self-interested agent will frequently find  it 
advantageous to reveal some information. How  much, and how  the amount is 
related to the similarity of agents' interests, are the subjects of this paper. 
While our primary motivations stem from the theory of bargaining, we have 
found  it useful  to  approach these questions in  a  more abstract setting, which 
allows us to identify the essential prerequisites for the solution we propose. There 
are  two  agents,  one  of  whom  has  private information  relevant  to  both.  The 
better-informed agent, henceforth called the Sender (S),  sends a possibly noisy 
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signal, based on his private information, to the other agent, henceforth called the 
Receiver (R).  R then makes a decision that affects the welfare of both, based on 
the information contained in the signal. In equilibrium, the decision rules that 
describe how  agents choose  their actions  in  the  situations in  which  they find 
themselves are best responses to each other. 
The  model  and  its  relationship to  the  literature are described in  Section  2. 
Under  assumptions  akin  to  those  commonly  maintained  in  the  signaling lit- 
erature, equilibrium is  characterized in  Section  3  in  a  strikingly simple  way. 
Although S's  choice of signaling rule is not restricted a priori, in equilibrium he 
partitions the support of the probability distribution of  the variable that repre- 
sents his private information and, in effect, introduces noise  into his signal by 
reporting only which element of the partition his observation actually lies in. This 
represents S's optimal compromise between including enough information in the 
signal to induce R to respond to it and holding back enough so that his response 
is as favorable as possible. 
There are, in general, several essentially different equilibria, but we argue in 
Sections  4  and  5  that  the  one  whose  partition  has  the  greatest  number  of 
elements  is  a  reasonable  one  for  agents  to  coordinate  on,  because  it  is  both 
salient  and,  before  S  observes his  private information,  Pareto-superior to  all 
other equilibria. Given this selection, we show under stronger assumptions that, 
in  a  sense  made  more  precise in  Sections  4  and  5,  the  more  similar agents' 
preferences, the more informative the equilibrium signal. 
Section  6  concludes  the  paper  with  a  brief  summary  and  suggestions  for 
further study. 
Our results have, in addition to their intrinsic interest, important implications 
for the design of  models that relate the quality of bargaining outcomes  to  the 
bargaining environment. In particular, the rationalist explanations of the occur- 
rence of bargaining impasses, and of  the relationship of  their frequency to the 
bargaining environment, with which we are familiar (see Chatterjee and Samuel- 
son  [1], Crawford [2], and  Sobel  and Takahashi [14], for example)  all rest on 
agents having different information, either about preferences or about the extent 
to which they have succeeded in committing themselves to their demands. These 
models  all  abstract  from  the  possibility  that  agents  may  find  it  useful  to 
communicate other than by their demands. Our model sheds some light on when 
this is an innocuous  simplification, and when it is likely to distort the conclu- 
sions. 
Our  model  is  also  potentially  applicable  to  many  other  situations  where 
strategic communication is a possibility. Example applications include business 
partnerships, doctor-patient and  lawyer-client relationships, and  oligopoly  (see 
Novshek  and Sonnenschein [12]). Finally, it can be viewed as a principal-agent 
model, with S the agent and R the principal. As will become clear in Section 2, 
however, we depart from the principal-agent literature by treating the principal 
and the agent strategically symmetrically, in contrast to the usual treatment of 
the principal as a Stackelberg leader. STRATEGIC  INFORMATION  TRANSMISSION  1433 
2.  THE MODEL 
There are two players, a Sender (S)  and a Receiver (R);  only  S has private 
information. S  observes the value of a random varible, m, whose differentiable 
probability distribution function, F(m),  with density f(m),  is supported on [0, 1]. 
S  has  a  twice  continuously  differentiable von  Neumann-Morgenstern  utility 
function  Us(y,m,  b), where y,  a real number, is  the action  taken by  R  upon 
receiving S's signal and b is a scalar parameter we shall later use to measure how 
nearly  agents'  interests  coincide.  R's  twice  continuously  differentiable  von 
Neumann-Morgenstem  utility function is denoted  UR(y, m). All aspects of the 
game except m are common knowledge. 
Throughout  the  paper we  shall  assume  that,  for  each  m  and  for  i =  R, S, 
denoting partial derivatives by subscripts in the usual way, U'(y, m) = 0 for some 
y,  and  U',(.)  < 0,  so that Ui has a unique maximum in y  for each given (m, b) 
pair; and that U12(*)  > 0. The latter condition is a sorting condition analogous to 
those that appear in the signaling literature; it ensures that the best value of y 
from a fully informed agent's standpoint is a strictly increasing function of the 
true value of m. 
The  game proceeds as follows.  S  observes his  "type," m, and  then  sends  a 
signal to R; the signal may be random, and can be viewed as a noisy estimate of 
m.  R  processes  the  information  in  S's  signal  and  chooses  an  action,  which 
determines players' payoffs. 
The solution concept we shall employ is Harsanyi's [4] Bayesian Nash equilib- 
rium, which is simply a Nash equilibrium in the decision rules that relate agents' 
actions to their information and to the situations in which they find themselves. 
Each  agent  responds optimally  to  his  opponent's  strategy choice,  taking into 
account its implications in the light of his probabilistic beliefs, and maximizing 
expected utility over his possible strategy choices. Although S's signal necessarily 
precedes R's  action  in  time, because  R  observes only  the signal (and  not  the 
signaling rule) S's  choice  of  signaling rule and  R's  choice  of  action  rule are 
strategically "simultaneous." Since we do not allow R to commit himself to an 
action rule and communicate it before S chooses his signaling rule, our solution 
concept  differs  from  that  employed  in  principal-agent  models  like  Hoim- 
strom's [6]. 
The  Bayesian  Nash  equilibrium is  both  the  natural  generalization  of  the 
ordinary Nash  equilibrium to games with incomplete information and a natural 
extension of the concept of rational-expectations equilibrium to situations where 
strategic interactions are important. It is, therefore, a sensible choice of equilib- 
rium concept with which to study strategic communication, guaranteeing that in 
equilibrium, agents who understand the game extract all available information 
from signals. To  put it  another way,  this equilibrium concept  guarantees that 
agents' conditional probabilistic beliefs about each other's actions and character- 
istics are self-confirming. 
Formally, an equilibrium consists of a family of signaling rules for S, denoted 1434  V. P. CRAWFORD  AND  J. SOBEL 
q(n I  m), and an action rule for R, denoted y(n),  such that: 
(1)  for each m E [0,1],  q(n  I  m) dn =  1, where the Borel set N is 
the set of feasible signals, and if n* is in the support of q(* I  m), 
then n* solves max Us(y(n),  m, b); and 
(2)  for each n,y(n)  solves maxf  UR (y,iM)p(iM  I  n)dm, 
wherep(m  I  n)-  q(n I  m)f(m)/J q(n  I  t)f(t)dt.2 
Condition (1) says that S's  signaling rule yields an expected-utility maximizing 
action  for  each  of  his  information  "types," taking  R's  action  rule  as  given. 
Condition (2) says that R responds optimally to each possible signal, using Bayes' 
Rule to update his prior, taking into account S's signaling strategy and the signal 
he receives. Since URl(_) < 0, the objective function in (2) is strictly concave iny; 
therefore, R will never use mixed strategies in equilibrium. 
Our model departs from the non-strategic signaling literature (see, for example, 
Spence  [15]) principally in  the  nature of  its  signaling costs.  Signaling models 
typically  have  exogenously  given  differential signaling  costs,  which  allow  the 
existence of  equilibria in which agents are perfectly sorted. Our model has no 
such costs. But R's equilibrium choice of action rule generally creates endogenous 
signaling  costs,  which  allow  equilibria with  partial  sorting.  This  shows  that 
exogenous  differential  signaling  costs  are  not  always  needed  for  informative 
signaling. 
Our model  is  closely  related  to  that  of  Green  and  Stokey  [3], who  study 
strategic information transmission using a definition of  equilibrium that differs 
2More precisely, we may define an equilibrium to be an action rule for R, denoted y(n),  and, for 
S, a probability distribution A  on the Borel-measurable subsets of [0, 1] X [N]  for which  '(A  X [N]) 
=  fAf  for all measurable sets A. Loeve [8, pp. 137-138]  shows that in this setting there exist regular 
conditional distributions q(  I  m) and p(  I  n) for (m, n) E [0, 1] x  [N].  Then, in place of (1) we have 
(a)  A solves max  'f  Us(y(n),  m, b) d/L, 
where the maximum is taken over all measures on the Borel-measurable subsets of [0, 1] X [N].  Since 
(b)  rf  fU  S(y  (n), m, b) dU = f  1  f  US(y  (n), m, b)q (dn I  m)]  dm, 
the conditional distributions q(  Ii  m) satisfy (1). 
Milgrom and Weber [11], who introduced this distributional approach, show that it is equivalent to 
the mixed strategies used in the text. In the present context, this formulation guarantees that q(  I  m) 
and p(  I  n) are measurable functions  of  m and  n and  hence  that the integrals in  (1) and (2)  are 
well-defined. References to the measure A, as well as to the fact that equalities hold almost surely, are 
suppressed in the text. If S observes m before choosing q(n I  m), the signaling rules for values of m 
other than the true one should be viewed as a way of formalizing R's beliefs about the meaning of 
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from ours only in assuming that an agent learns his private information after his 
choice  of  strategy. We  have  adopted  the  alternative assumption  that  agents 
already know their private information when choosing their strategies, but in the 
present context  the  two  definitions  are equivalent. Thus,  the  main  difference 
between our paper and Green and Stokey's is the question considered. They take 
preferences as given and study the effects of  improved information on  agents' 
welfares at equilibrium; we take information as given and study how agents use 
it differently when their preferences become more similar. (Holmstrom [6] studies 
the latter question in a principal-agent model.) Green and Stokey's [3] model has 
many equilibria, including some, which they call "partition" equilibria, in which 
S introduces noise only by not discriminating as finely as possible in his signal 
among the different information states he is capable of distinguishing; they focus 
on  these. As pointed out above, our model has multiple equilibria as well, but 
only partition equilibria. This difference arises because of our additional restric- 
tions on preferences. 
Our model is also related to those of Kreps and Wilson [7] and Milgrom and 
Roberts [9,10], who handle the problem of information transmission in the same 
way we do. Milgrom and Roberts' [9] model is closest in form to ours; but they 
focus mainly on perfectly informative equilibria. This precludes the study of the 
optimal amount of noise to include in a signal. Perfectly informative equilibria 
do not exist in our model, mainly because we assume that signaling has no cost 
to S other than that inherent in its effect on R's choice of action. 
3.  EQUILIBRIUM 
This section establishes the existence of equilibria in our model, and character- 
izes  them. It is  shown  that all  equilibria are partition equilibria, in  which,  in 
effect, S introduces noise into his signal only by not discriminating as finely as 
possible among the information states he can distinguish. Further, we show that 
if R's and S's preferences differ, there is a finite upper bound, denoted N(b),  on 
the "size" (that is, the number of subintervals) of an equilibrium partition; and 
that there exists at least one  equilibrium of  each  size from one  through N(b). 
Necessary and sufficient conditions for a partition of a given size to be consistent 
with equilibrium are given. In Sections 4 and 5, we give conditions that guarantee 
uniqueness of equilibrium for each size, and argue that agents might reasonably 
be expected to coordinate on the equilibrium of size N(b). 
We  shall defer, for the sake of  exposition,  consideration of  the form of  the 
equilibrium signaling rules, and begin by considering the structure of the set of 
actions that, in equilibrium, are chosen by R with positive prior probability. 
Let N  {n :y(n)  =y}.  We say that an actiony  is induced by an S-type mn  if 
jN q(n I  Fli) dn > 0.  Notice  that if  Y is  the  set  of  all  actions  induced  by  some 
S-type,  then  if  mi induces y,  Us(y,  iii, b) = maxy,  y  Us(y,  rn,  b).  (We  assume 
without loss of  generality that R  takes actions in  Y for values of  n not in the 
support of any q(  I  m).)  Since U sj(.) < 0, US(y, m, b) can take on a given value 
for at most two values of y.  Thus, mn  can induce no more than two actions in 1436  V. P. CRAWFORD  AND  J. SOBEL 
equilibrium. Define, for all m E  [0, 1], 
(3)  y S(m, b) _  arg max Us(y,  m, b) 
and 
(4)  yR(m)  -arg  max UR  (y, m), 
where arg max Us(y,m,  b), for example, denotes the value of y  that maximizes 
Us(y,m,b).  Since  U",(*) < O and  U2(  )>  O, i=R,S,yS(m,  b) and yR(m)  are 
well defined and continuous in m. 
LEMMA  1:  If yS(m,  b) ==  y  R(M)  for all m,  then there exists an E > 0 such that if 
u and v are actions induced in equilibrium, Iu  -  vI  >  e. Further, the set of actions 
induced in equilibrium  is finite. 
PROOF: Let u and v, with u <  v, be two actions induced in equilibrium. Since 
an S-type who induces u (v)  thereby reveals a weak preference for that action 
over  v (u),  by  continuity  there  exists  an  mii  E [0, 1]  such  that  Us(u, iii, b)= 
US(vfii,  b). Since U(  ) < 0 and U (s)  > 0, it follows from this that 
(5)  u<ys(ii,b)<v, 
(6)  u is not induced by any S-type m >  m, and 
(7)  v is not induced by any S-type m <  mii. 
In turn, (6), (7), and our assumption that U1R(_) > 0 imply that 
(8)  u?yR(rn)<v. 
However,  if yR(m)  #yS(m,b)  for  all  m E [0,1],  there  is  an  e  > 0  such  that 
IYR(m) -ys(m,b)i  I  e  for all m E [0,1]. It follows from (5) and (8) that v -  u 
>  e. Since the set of  actions induced in equilibrium is bounded  by yR(Q)  and 
yR(l)  because UR(.)  > 0, this completes the proof.  Q.E.D. 
REMARKS:  Lemma 1 establishes that, under our assumptions, equilibrium must 
involve noisy  signaling unless agents' interests coincide.  Because  signaling is a 
purely informational activity in our model, it cannot be perfectly invertible and 
informative, as  it  is,  for  example,  in  the  principal equilibria of  Milgrom  and 
Roberts [9]. The argument of Lemma 1 can be used to establish that if  Us2 and 
UR are one-signed, but have opposite signs, then only one action can be induced 
in equilibrium. Thus in this case no information is transmitted. 
We  shall now  argue that when  agents' interests differ, all  equilibria in  our 
model  are  partition  equilibria of  a  particular kind.  First,  some  notation  for 
describing partition equilibria is needed. Let a(N)  -(aO(N),  ..  *.  , aN(N))  denote 
a partition of [0, 1] with N  steps and dividing points between steps ao(N),  . . ., 
aN(N),  where  0 =  ao(N)  <  al(N)  <  ...  <  aN(N)  =  1. Whenever  it can  be  done 
without loss of clarity in what follows, we shall write a or a, instead of a(N)  or STRATEGIC  INFORMATION  TRANSMISSION  1437 
ai(N).  Define, for all a, a E [0, 1], a <  a, 
I  arg  max  uR  (y,  m)f(m) dm  if  a<a, 
yR(a)  if  a=a. 
Now  we  are  ready  to  state  Theorem  1,  which  establishes  the  existence  of 
equilibria, and characterizes them. 
THEOREM  1: Suppose b  is such that y S(m, b) #  y R(m)  for  all  m.  Then there 
exists a positive integer N(b) such that,  for every N with 1 <  N <  N(b),  there exists 
at  least one equilibrium (y(n), q(n I  m)),  where q(n I  m) is  uniform, supported on 
[ai, ai, 1] if m E (ai, ai+ 1) 
(A)  US(y(ai,  a,+ 1),  ai, b) -  Us(Y(ai_  1,  a), ai, b) = 0 
(=1,9  ..  N -1), 
(10)  y(n)  = y(a1 , ai+ 1)  for  all  n E  (a9,  a1+  j) 
(1 1)  ao= 0  and 
(12)  aN=  1. 
Further,  any equilibrium  is essentially3  equivalent  to one in this class, for some value 
of N with 1 <N<N(b). 
REMARKS:  Theorem  1 establishes the existence  of  a partition equilibrium of 
every size from one (completely uninformative) to N(b)  (the most informative, in 
a  sense made  precise below),  where N(b)  is  determined by  b,  the preference- 
similarity parameter. If  preferences  are  identical  for  some  value  of  b,  or  if 
y S(m,  b) =yR(m)  for some m, existence is easily established, but finiteness does 
not hold in general. 
PROOF: The outline of the proof is as follows. Given Lemma  1, each S-type 
must, in  an  equilibrium of  size N,  choose  from a  set of  N  values  of y.  Since 
Ujs(-) > 0, the S-types for whom each value of y  that occurs in equilibrium is 
best form an interval, and these intervals form a partition of [0, 1]. The partition, 
a,  is determined by (A), a well-defined second-order nonlinear difference equa- 
tion in the ai,  and (11) and (12), its initial and terminal conditions. Equation (A) 
is an  "arbitrage" condition,  requiring that S-types  who  fall on  the boundaries 
between  steps  are  indifferent  between  the  associated  values  of y.  With  our 
assumptions on  Us,  this condition  is necessary and sufficient for S's  signaling 
rule  to  be  a  best  response  to y(n).  Finally,  given  the  signaling  rules in  the 
3By  "essentially," we  mean  that all  equilibria have  relationships between  m  and  R's  induced 
choice  of y  that are the same as those in the class described in the Theorem; they are, therefore, 
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statement of the Theorem, it is easily verified that the integral on the right-hand 
side of (9) is R's expected utility conditional on hearing a signal in the step (a, a). 
It follows that (10) gives R's  unique best response to a signal in (ai, ail  i),  and 
that  the  signaling rules given  in  the  Theorem  are in  equilibrium. Any  other 
signaling rules that induce the same actions would also work;4 and we close by 
arguing that any other signaling rules consistent with an equilibrium of a given 
size must, given Lemma 1, induce the same actions. 
Formally, we begin by  showing that (A), (11), and (12) form a well-defined 
difference equation, that it has a solution for any N such that 1 <  N <  N(b),  and 
that any solution, a, together with the signaling rules given in the Theorem, is a 
best response for S to they(n)  that satisfies (10) for the same a. In the rest of this 
section we sometimes suppress the dependence of  Us  on b for notational clarity. 
First, note that, by (9) and our assumption that UR(.)  >  0, y(ai, ai  +  ) must be 
strictly increasing in both  of  its arguments. Let a'  denote  the partial partition 
ao, .. .,  ai, which is strictly increasing and satisfies (A). There can be  at most 
one value of ai  I >  ai satisfying (A), because  Usl(-)  < 0  and y(-)  is monotonic. 
Thus any history ao, . . .,  ai determines at most one relevant ai+  1  >  ai.5 
Let 
K(a)  max{i:  there exists 0 <  a <  a2 <  .  .  .  <  a, <  1 satisfying (A)}. 
When y s(m, b)  y R(m) for every m, it follows from Lemma 1 that y(a1, ai + ) - 
y(ai-,  ai)  E for some  e > 0;  hence  ai+  2-  ai is bounded  above  zero for  any 
solution  of  (A).  Thus K(a)  is finite, well  defined,  and  uniformly bounded,  so 
supO<a<  IK(a) is achieved for some a Ee  (0, 1]. Let N(b)  _  K(a)  <  oo. It remains 
to show that for each N such that 1 <  N <  N(b),  there is a partition a satisfying 
(A), (11), and (12). Let a K(a)  be the partial partition of length K(a)  that satisfies 
(A) and al  (a)  =  a. Since solutions to (A) vary continuously with respect to initial 
conditions, if aK(a)  (the last term in the partial partition a K(a))  is less than unity, 
K(-)  is  continuous  (and  therefore locally  constant)  at a;  moreover, K(a)  can 
change by at most one at a discontinuity. Finally, K(l)  =  1, so K(a)  takes on all 
integer values between one and N(b).  If K(a,)  =  N and K(a)  is discontinuous at 
a =  a,,  then a satisfies (A), (11), and (12). 
Now we shall argue that if a satisfies (A), (1 1), and (12), any signal in (ai, ai+ 1) 
is a best response for an S of type m E (ai, ai  + ) to they(n)  given by (10). More 
4In particular, there is a pure-strategy equilibrium in which the S-types  within each step send a 
given signal that differs from those sent by other S-types. To support an equilibrium described this 
way, it is necessary to include, as part of the equilibrium, a specification of how R interprets signals 
that are not in the support of the signaling rule used by some S-type in equilibrium. In the present 
context, any such specification that does not expand the set of R's best-response actions will do. 
5We  are able  to  restrict attention  to  the  strictly increasing partitions that  satisfy  (A)  because 
Us(.)  < 0 and the monotonicity of y(  ) ensure that the only nondecreasing solutions, a, to (A), (11), 
and  (12)  satisfy ai <  ai+  1 unless ai = 0  or ai+ I =  1. In  the latter two  cases,  an  extreme S-type  is 
indifferent between perfectly revealing his type and sending a signal in the adjacent step. Because 
m = 0 and m =  1 occur only with zero probability from R's standpoint, these equilibria are therefore 
essentially equivalent to those in which the extreme S-type does not reveal himself. STRATEGIC  INFORMATION  TRANSMISSION  1439 
precisely, (A) implies that 
(13)  Us(y(a,,a+,+),m)=maxUs(y(aj,aj+),m)  forall  mE  [a,,a,1j], 
where the maximum in (13) is taken overj  = O,..  ,  N -  1. To see this, note that 
because Us  1(*) < 0 and y(ai, ai+ 1) > y(ai  -1, ai), (A) implies (13)  for m = ai. Since 
Uj(  ) > 0  and m E [ai,aj+1], 
(14)  US(y(a1,  ai+ 1), m) -  US(y(ak  , ak+ 1) m) 
>  US(y(a,  ai+ 1),  ai) -  US(y(ak,  ak+  1),  ai) ? 0  and 
(15)  Us(y(ai,  ai+ 1),  m) -  US(y(a,  a+ 1),  m) 
>  US(y(a,  ai+ 1), ai+ 1) -  US(y(a,  aj+ 1),  ai+ 1) ? 0, 
where  (14)  and  (15)  hold  for  any  0<k<i<j<N  and  mE[ai,ai+I].  Con- 
versely, it is clear from this argument that, except for S-types  who  fall on  the 
boundaries between steps, only signals of this kind are best responses for S. 
Now consider R. Provided that S's signaling rule is chosen to be uniform as in 
the statement of the Theorem, when R hears a signal in the step (ai, ai+ 1) 
(16)  p(m I  n)  q(n I  m)f(m)  fa+'q(n  I  t)f(t)dt=f(m)  fa+If(t)dt. 
Thus his conditional expected utility is 
(17)  aia  i UR(y,  m)p(m I  n) dm  =  + lUR  (y,  m)f(m)  dm  f+ 'f(t)  dt. 
Therefore, y(ai, ai  +  )  as  defined  in  (9)  is  a  best  response  for  R  to  a  signal 
n E (ai, ai+ 1) 
Conversely, Lemma  1 shows that any equilibrium is a partition equilibrium, 
and  the above  arguments show  that any  equilibrium partition, a,  must satisfy 
(A), (11), and (12) for some value of N  between unity and N(b).  Let yi  be the 
action  induced  by  an  S-type  m e  (ai,ai+1)  and  let  Ni  {n  :y(n)  =yi};  if  R 
hears a signal n E Ni in such an equilibrium, his conditional  expected utility is 
proportional  to fiaUR(y(n);  m)q(n I  m)f(m) dm. Since  is a best response to 
any signal n E Ni, it must also maximize 
(18)  fai+  I  UR  (y(n),  m)q(n  I  m)f(m)  dn dm  I+UR  (y(n),  m)f(m)  dm, 
where the identity follows because y(n)  is constant over the range of integration 
and  conditional  densities  integrate to  unity.  It  follows  that  all  equilibria are 
essentially  equivalent  to  those  with  uniform  signaling  rules,  as  given  in  the 
statement of the Theorem.  Q.E.D. 
For 0 <  ai-1 <  ai <  a+j1 <  1, let 
(19)  V(a_1  , ai,  ai+  1,  b)  Us(y(ai,  ai+l  ), ai,  b)  -  Us(y(ai_1,  ai),  ai,  b). 1440  V. P. CRAWFORD  AND  J. SOBEL 
V(  ) is the difference in utility to S-type ai between y(ai, ai+)  and y(ai1,  ai). 
The  following  Lemma establishes properties of  V that are useful in proving 
Corollary 1 and in the analysis of Section 5. 
LEMMA  2:  If  V(ai-1,ai,ai  1,b)  =  0  for  0  <  ai-I  <  ai  <  ai+I  <  1,  then 
Us (y(a,  ai), ai, b) > 0 and  VI(a, ai, ai, 1,  b) <0  for  all a E  [0, aJ  1], and  Us (y(ai, 
a), ai, b) < 0 and V3(ai  1,  ai, a, b) < Ofor all a E  [ai+1, 1]. 
PROOF: Since Us(y(ai-  1,  ai), ai, b) =  Us(y(ai,  ai+ 1),  ai, b) by hypothesis, y(ai, 
ai+ 1) > y(ai-  1,  ai), and  U1s1(-)  < 0,  Uj (y, ai, b) > 0 for y <  y(ai1,ai)  and  Uj(y, 
ai, b) < 0  for y ?  Yj(ai,  ai+  ).  The  Lemma  follows  from  the  definition  of  V 
becausey(.)  is strictly increasing in both of its arguments.  Q.E.D. 
The  next  result provides a  simple condition  on  preferences that guarantees 
they are far enough apart so that the only equilibrium is totally uninformative. 
COROLLARY  1:  If  V(O,  a, 1,  b) >  0 for all a E [0, 1], then N(b)  =  1; that is, the 
only equilibrium  is uninformative. 
REMARKS:  If yS(a,  b) > yR(a)  for  all  a,  as  we  assume  in  Section  5,  then 
V(O,  a, 1,  b) > 0 for all sufficiently large values of a. This is because  if y S(a, b) 
2  y R  (1) then an S  of  type a wishes to induce R to take as large an action as 
possible. In particular, if y S(Q, b) 2  yR(l)  then N(b)  =  1. Under the monotonic- 
ity condition, (M), we shall impose in the comparative statics analysis of Section 
5, the condition of the Corollary is equivalent to  Us(y(O,  1),  0, b) >  Us(y(O, 0), 
0, b). This means that an S of type m = 0 would rather be completely disguised 
than perfectly revealed. 
PROOF: It follows  from Lemma 2  that if  V(O,  a,, a2, b) = 0  for  some  0 < a, 
<  a2 <  1  then  V(O,a,, 1,b) < 0.  Hence  V(O,a, 1,b) > 0 for all a E [0, 1] implies 
that there is no partition equilibrium of size two. Thus, by Theorem 1, N(b)  =  1. 
Q.E.D. 
4.  AN  EXAMPLE 
This  section  works  out  a  simple  example,  to  serve  as  an  antidote  to  the 
abstractness of  the  previous  section  and  an  introduction  to  the  comparative 
statics questions we shall ask in the next section. In the example, F(m)  is uniform 
(on [0, 1]), Us(y,m,  b)  -  (y  -  (m +  b))2, where b > 0 without loss of general- 
ity,  and  UR(y,  m)  -  (y -  M)2.  These  specifications  satisfy  all  of  our  main- 
tained assumptions, and have a convenient certainty-equivalence property. 
Consider the  conditions  that characterize a partition equilibrium of  size N. 
Letting a denote the partition as before, we can compute 
y(iai,  =  .a 
X 
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The arbitrage condition (A) specializes to 
(20)  -a(  a12  +  -  b)  b(  i-  a1  -a1-b) 
(i =1,  . ..  , N -1), 
which can only hold, given the monotonicity of a, if 
(21)  ai+1 = 2ai-aai-  + 4b  (i=  1, ...,  N-1). 
This second-order linear difference equation has a class of solutions parametrized 
by al (given that ao = 0): 
(22)  a,=a,i+2i(i-l)b  (i=1,...,N). 
N(b)  in Theorem 1 is the largest positive integer i such that 2i(i  -  l)b  <  1, which 
is easily shown to be 
(2  2  b  1+- 
(where <z> denotes the smallest integer greater than or equal to z).  Thus, it is 
clear  that  the  closer  b  approaches  zero-the  more  nearly  agents'  interests 
coincide-the  finer partition equilibria there can be. (We use "finer" informally, 
not in the sense of information theory.) As b -*  oo, N(b)  eventually falls to unity, 
and only the completely uninformative equilibrium remains; in fact, this occurs 
in our example as soon as b exceeds  1/4,  as predicted by Corollary 1. 
It is natural to ask which of these equilibria is best for R and S. In general, the 
answer ex post will be different for different values of m; but ex ante, the answer 
is simple. If am2  denotes the residual variance of m R expects to have after hearing 
the  equilibrium signal, it  is  easy  to  verify that R's  and  S's  ex  ante  expected 
utilities are given  by  EUR  =  _  2  and  EUs  =  -  (a2 +  b2). These  expressions 
reflect the facts that quadratic loss equals variance plus the square of bias and 
that the rational-expectations character of Bayesian Nash  equilibrium eliminates 
all unconditional bias from R's interpretation of S's  signal. R's desire to sety  at 
a level b units lower than S would prefer appears as a bias from S's  standpoint. 
As the expressions for EUR  and EUs  make clear, before S learns his type, he has 
an incentive to join with R in reducing variance as much as possible. 
Using  (22) and substituting for the value of a,,  (1 -  2N(N  -  I)b)/N,  deter- 
mined by aN  =  1 yields 
(23)  ai =  N+2bi(i-N)  =0,  * *  N), 
and 
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It follows that 
N  ai_1 +a1  2  1N 
(25)  12  dm  Jai  -  a;,_ 
c  q  1E3 
(25)  2  [  m-  +2b(2i-N-1)  -  _ 
If  N  71:~v.lI  )-12N2  +  3 
For a given value of N, am2  is a convex function of N positive terms that sum to 
unity, so moving the terms closer together always reduces am2.  Letting b approach 
zero clearly does this, and am2 is plainly minimized, for given N, when b = 0, since 
only then are all terms equalized. The expression in (25) can be used to show that 
for a given value of b, the partition equilibrium of size N(b)  (the largest possible) 
minimizes a  2,  and  is  therefore ex  ante  Pareto-superior to  all  other equilibria. 
Since  we  shall later prove  a  generalization of  this,  these  calculations  are not 
reproduced here. 
While it must be  admitted that comparative statics is a risky business when 
there are multiple equilibria, we  view  these results as  tending  to  confirm  our 
intuition that equilibrium should involve more informative signaling the closer 
agents' interests. There are two reasons for this. First, for a partition of given size, 
letting b approach zero reduces the equilibrium variance in our example. And 
second,  letting b  approach zero, when  it  expands  the  set of  sizes of  partition 
equilibria that  can  exist,  always  does  so  in  the  direction  of  making  possible 
equilibria with  "finer" partitions, and  therefore lower variances. Because  F  is 
fixed and R bases his choice of y on rational expectations, it is natural to take his 
expected  utility as  a  measure of  informativeness. In  the  quadratic case,  EUR 
=  -  am2, so if jumps from one size of partition to another occur, if at all, only in 
the direction in which the set of equilibria expands, our intuition about compara- 
tive statics will be  fully borne out. These  conclusions  suggest that it might be 
useful to  seek more general conditions  under which  making preferences more 
similar shifts the set of equilibria in a more informative direction; we do this in 
the next section. 
But first, we  would  like to  consider, in  the relatively simple context  of  our 
example, whether complete  agnosticism  about  which  equilibrium will  occur is 
justified, or if some can be ruled out by making further plausible assumptions. 
Two  promising  avenues  of  this  type  seem  open  to  us.  The  first is  to  apply 
Schelling's [13, Chapter 4] idea of seeking equilibria that seem "prominent," in 
the hope that they might serve as "focal points" to help agents coordinate their 
strategy choices. It seems clear to us that in our model, the coarsest and the finest 
partition equilibria for a given value of b are prominent. The coarsest one, which 
is necessarily totally uninformative, does not seem very sensible to us (partly for 
efficiency reasons discussed below), so there remains a case for the equilibrium 
with  N  =  N(b). 
The second avenue is to apply Harsanyi's [5, Chapter 7] suggestion that only 
equilibria that are not Pareto-inferior to other equilibria are likely to be observed. 
The  idea  here  is  that  if  the  possibilities  for  enforcing  agreements have  been 
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enforceable. But within the set of equilibria, the usual ceteris paribus tendency 
for efficient outcomes to prevail in economic situations should remain. If agent S 
learns his type before he has an opportunity to reach an agreement with R about 
coordinating strategy choices, there is little to be gained from this approach. As 
we shall see shortly, different S-types  have quite different desires about which 
equilibrium should occur, and it would therefore be quite difficult for an S who 
knew his type to negotiate about a selection from the equilibrium correspondence 
without revealing information about his type beyond that contained in his signal 
(and thereby vitiating our characterization of  equilibrium). But if the selection 
agreement is made ex ante for a single play of the game, or if it is viewed as a 
convention evolved over repeated play against different opponents, a strong case 
can again be made, in the example, for the equilibrium with the finest partition: 
N = N(b).  This leads to  the comparative statics results we hoped  to  establish. 
The  arguments of  the next  section  show that this case  for the finest partition 
equilibrium remains intact under a reasonable assumption that is satisfied in our 
example  but  goes  considerably  beyond  it.  We  conclude  that  the  problems 
inevitably associated with multiple equilibria are particularly mild here. 
Continuing  the  analysis  of  the  example,  consider  the  case  b =  1/20.  Then 
N(b)  =  <-  1/2  + (1/2)V4T1  > = 3, and there are three partition equilibria: K =  1, 
with ao(1) = 0 and al(1) =  1; K=  2, with ao(2) = 0, a1(2) = 2/5,  and a2(2) =  1; 
and K = 3, with ao(3) = 0, al(3) =  2/15,  a2(3) = 7/15,  and a3(3) =  1. The reader 
can  easily verify that for K =  1, the utility of  an  S  of  type m (who  faces  no 
uncertainty) is  -  ((9/20)  -  m)2;  for K =  2, it is  -  ((3/20)  -  m)2  if  m  E  [0,2/5) 
and  -((13/20)  -  m)2  if  m E (2/5,  1]; and  for  K = 3,  it  is  -((1  /60)  -  m)2  if 
mrE[0,2/15),  -((1/4)-rm)2  if  mrE(2/15,7/15),  and  -((41/60)-rm)2  if  m 
E (7/15,  1]. These imply, as Figure  1 shows, that K=  1 is best for m E  (7/20, 
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11/20);  K=  2 is best for m E (1/12,1/5)  and m E (11/20,2/3);  and K=  3 is 
best  for  m E  [0,1/12),  m E (1/5,7/20),  and  m E (2/3,  1].  Different  S-types 
generally prefer different equilibria. 
Before moving on  to the more general analysis of  the next section, consider 
how  the equilibrium payoffs  of  the S-types  in  the equilibria just  characterized 
compare with the payoffs  that would result from the truth, if it were believed 
byR. (The truth always yields R a payoff of zero.) The reader can verify that S's 
equilibrium payoff  is  as  good  or  better  than  truth-telling, which  yields  him 
-  b2=  -  1/400,  if  and  only  if  (barring  ties):  m E (2/5,1/2)  when  K =  1; 
m E  (1/10,  1/5)  or m E (3/5,7/10)  when K = 2;  and m E  [0, 1/15),  m E (1/5, 
3/10),  or m E (19/30,11/15)  when K = 3. It is therefore frequently true that a 
commitment to tell the truth would, if believed, pay off. (In the example, such 
commitments are always beneficial ex ante, since they raise EUs  from  -  (b2 + 
a2)  to  -  b2; we  have  been  unable  to  verify whether this is  true under more 
general conditions.)  In  our model,  such  commitments  are impossible  because 
they are unenforceable: R would interpret a true signal incorrectly because he is 
aware of  the incentives for S  to  lie,  and  S  cannot, within  the confines  of  our 
game, remove these incentives. Even though he would like to tell the truth, he is 
forced to cut his losses by lying as the equilibrium in force dictates. This result is 
strongly reminiscent of the main result in Milgrom and Roberts [9]. 
5. COMPARATIVE STATICS 
It is natural to ask at this point to what extent the strong comparative statics 
results that hold  in  our example can  be  generalized beyond  the  specifications 
used in Section 4. While we cannot offer a complete answer to this question at 
present, this section provides more general sufficient conditions to establish that 
the results are not merely artifacts of our choice of example. 
Recall that V(ai1,ai,ai+1,b)_  Us(y(ai,ai+1),ai,b)  -  Us(y(ai1,ai),ai,b).  It 
will be assumed throughout this section that Us(y,  m, 0) _  UR(y,  m),  that b ? 0, 
and that Us3(-) > 0 everywhere. These assumptions guarantee that V4(-)  > 0 and 
that y s(m,  b) > y R(m)  for  all b > 0;  they  are satisfied in  our examples.  That 
Us(-)  > 0 means that an increase in b shifts S's  preferences away from R's for 
all values of m. For a fixed value of b, we shall call a sequence  {ao, . . . , aN} a 
forward (backward) solution to (A)  if  V(ai -1, ai, ai+ 1,  b) = 0 for 0 <  i <  N  and 
ao <  a,  (ao >  a,).  We shall impose in addition the following monotonicity  condi- 
tion on solutions of (A): 
(M) For a given value of b, if a' and a are two forward solutions of (A) with 
aO  =  ao and a,  > a-, then ai>  ai for all i>  2. 
At times it will be convenient to use the following equivalent form of (M): 
(M') For a given value of b, if a and a are two backward solutions of (A) with 
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Assumption  (M)  requires that  for  a  given  value  of  b,  starting  from  any 
ao E [0, 1], the economically relevant solutions of (A) must all move up or down 
together. It  therefore guarantees that  the boundary-value problem  defined  by 
(A), (11), and (12) has at most one solution for fixed N,  and thus enables us to 
compare partitions of fixed size as b varies. It is immediately clear from (22) that 
(M)  is  always  satisfied in  our example  and  that it  is  robust at least  to  small 
deviations  from  our  example.  Theorem  2  provides  conditions  on  priors and 
preferences that imply (M): 
THEOREM  2:  For a given value of b, if U2s(y,  a, b) +  Us(y,  a, b) is nondecreasing 
in y  and fa U/(y,  m)f(m) dm +  U1R(y,  a)f(a)  is nonincreasing in a,  then all solu- 
tions to (A) satisfy condition (M). 
PROOF:  Let ao E [0, 1) be given. To study how solutions to (A) change when 
the initial conditions  vary, we  specify yo >  y R(ao). Let  a-{  ao,...  ,  aN }  and 
Y-{YO  YO  YN} be the sequences that satisfy 
(26)  fai+iU  (yi,m)f(m)dm=  O  (i  O, ...  N-1), 
and 
(27)  Us(yi,  ai, b)-  Us(y  1,  ai, b)=O?  (i=  1,*,  N-1). 
Given ai, (26) determines ai  +1 as a function of yi; given yi - 1,  (27) determines  yi as 
a  function  of  ai.  Totally  differentiating (26)  with  respect to yi  and  (27)  with 
respect to ai yields 
(28)  fai+ i uR (yi ,m)f(m)  dm 
-UR(yi,  ai+  1)f(ai+  )vi -  UR(yi,  ai)f(ai)wi- 
I 
(i =O,~...,9N -1), 
and 
(29)  Us(yi,  ai,  b)  -  U2(yi-  1, ai,  b)  =Us(yi-  1,  ai,  b)vi_1  -  Us(yi,  ai,  b)wi 
(i  =  ,.  N -1), 
where  vi _  dai+I/dyi  (i = O,  ...  ,  N -  1),  wO1  0,  and  wi  dyi/dai  (i =  1, 
..  , N -  1). For  fixed  ao,  an  initial  specification  of yo  determines 
vo=  a  , UR  (yo  , m)f(m)  dm/  UiR(y0,  a,l(a  ) 
and  then  (28) and  (29) determine  vi and  wi for i =  1, . ..  , N -  1. Since  dai+ I/daI 
is given by IIJ 1wjvj, to prove the Theorem it suffices to show that wi >  1 and 
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First, vo 2  1, since 
(30)  Sa,  UR (yo  m)f(m) dm  Ja, UR  1(yo  m)f(m)dm 
+  faoU(yo  ,m)f(m)  dm 
?  UR(yo,  al)f(al)  -  U(y0,  ao)f(ao) 
?  UR  (y0, alfflal)  > OX 
The first inequality in (30) follows by hypothesis, since a,  >  ao, while the second 
and third follow from (26), since  URl(_) <  0,  UR2(.) > 0, and a,  >  ao. The proof 
now  follows  by  induction,  for  if  vi_ 1  1  then  wi 2  1 by  (29),  the  fact  that 
yi > yi- 1, Lemma 2, and the hypothesis that  Us(y,  a, b) +  Uls(y, a, b) is nonde- 
creasing in y.  If  wi 2  1, then vi >  1 follows  by  a  similar argument from (28). 
Q.E.D. 
REMARKS:  The conditions of Theorem 2 are met by our example. They  also 
hold for more general specifications. For example, if F(m)  is uniform (on [0, 1]) 
and, for i =  R, S, U'(*) depends on y  and m only through y  -  m (that is, if there 
exist concave functions  Ui such that Us(y,m,  b)  -US(y  -  m,b)  and  UR(y, m) 
-UR(y-  iM)),  then the functions required by the hypotheses of Theorem 2 to 
be nondecreasing and nonincreasing are both constant. Thus, (M) is guaranteed 
to hold if, after m is rescaled to make F(m)  uniform (which can be done without 
affecting  the  signs  of  the  U'1(.)  and  UlI2( )),  each  player's preferences  shift 
uniformly with m. It is also clear from the proof that the hypotheses of Theorem 
2 are significantly stronger than (M): the proof established that an increase in a, 
leads to larger increases in all subsequent ai, but all that (M) really requires is 
that all  of  the  subsequent ai increase. Since (M)  is,  in  turn, only  a  sufficient 
condition  for  the  comparative  statics  results  that  follow,  the  hypotheses  of 
Theorem 2 are quite far from being necessary for the comparative statics results 
to hold. 
We shall now pause to establish a few useful lemmas. 
LEMMA  3:  For a given value of b, if 1 <  N <  N(b),  there is exactly one partition 
equilibrium  of size N. Further,  if a(N, b) and a(N',  b) are two equilibrium  partitions 
for the same value of b, and if N'  = N +  1, then ai- 1(N, b) <  ai(N', b) <  ai(N, b) 
for all i=  1, . . .,  N. 
PROOF:  The first statement is an immediate consequence  of Theorem  1 and 
assumption (M). That ai(N', b) <  ai(N, b) follows because if ai(N', b) 2  ai(N, b) 
for some i =  1, . ..  , N,  then a1(N', b) 2  aI(N,b)  by (M). This leads to a contra- STRATEGIC  INFORMATION  TRANSMISSION  1447 
diction  of  aN,(N',  b) =  aN(N, b) =  1.  That  ai -(N,  b) < ai(N', b)  follows  from 
(M') by a similar argument.  Q.E.D. 
Lemma  4  says  that  if  two  partial partitions have  the  same  endpoints,  the 
partition associated with  agents' preferences closer together begins  with larger 
steps. This follows because the rate of increase of  step size increases as prefer- 
ences diverge. That is, if ai_- <  ai are fixed and b >  b', then whenever ail I(b) 
and ai+ I(b') >  ai satisfy 
V(a-  1' a1  , a1+l  I(b), b) =  V(a-  1,  ai , ai  + I(b ), b)  = 0, 
then ai+ I(b) >  ai+ I(b'). 
LEMMA  4:  If  a(K, b) and a(K, b') are two partial partitions of length K satis- 
fying  (A)  with  b' <  b,  and  ao(K, b) =  ao(K, b') = 0,  then  aK(K,  b) =  aK(K,  b') 
implies that ai(K, b) <  ai(K, b') for all i =  1, . . . , K -  1. 
PROOF: The proof is by induction on K. For K =  1, the Lemma is vacuously 
true. Suppose that K >  1 and that the conclusion  of the Lemma is true for all 
i =  1, ...  , K-  1. Fix b >  b', and let a(K, b) and a(K, b') be as in the statement 
of  the  Lemma.  Suppose  by  way  of  contradiction  that  aj(K, b) ? aj(K, b')  for 
somej  such that 0 < j  <  K; suppose further thatj  is the largest index less than K 
such that this inequality is satisfied, so that ai(K, b) <  ai(K, b') for all i such that 
j  <  i <  K.  Let  Xa  (xa0,xaj, . ..  , Xaj) be  the  partial  partition  that  satisfies 
V(xai- ,xai,xai+i,b')=O  for  i =  1, . . . ,j-1  with  xa0= 0  and  XaI  =  x.  Since 
aj(K, b')  =aI(Kb'  )a  and, by assumption, aj(K, b) >  aj(K, b'), it follows  from (M) 
and the continuity of Xa  in x that there is an x-  >  aI(K, b') such that aj(K, b) = Xaj 
and that Xaj  ?  ai(K, b') for 1 <  i < j.  Let xa =_.  We can establish the following 
relationships: 
(31)  V(dj1,  aj(K, b), aj+ I(K, b), b) ?  V(-  1, aj(K, b), aj+ I(K, b'), b) 
>  V(d -,_,aj(K,b),aj+I(K,b'),  ?) 
=  V(ja- I_  l,  a->,a+  i(K,  bl),bl)  2  0. 
The first step follows  because  a>+  1(K,  b) <  a>+  1(K,  b') and  Us(y(aj(K,  b), a), 
aj(K, b), b) is decreasing in a  for a >  aj+I (K,  b) by  Lemma 2;  the second  step 
follows  because  V(., b)>  V(,  b');  the  third  step  follows  because  aj(K, b) = 
a->. To  verify  the  final  inequality  first  observe  that  Us(y(a>_  1,  a.), a,  b') < 
Us(yR(a->),a-j,b'),  since  Us(y,a->,b')  is  increasing  in y  for y < ys(a-j,b)  and 
y(a->_  l,  a->)  <KyR(a-1)  <Ky S(a);  this implies that either V(aj 1,  -, a,b')  > 0 and so 
V(d->  j,  a->,  a,)  > 0 for all a E -  1] or there is a unique aj>+  I E  (a>, 1] such that 
V(d  -  -j, a-j  +  1,  b') = 0 and V(  1,aj, a, b') ? 0 for a E [a->,  a->+  I1.  If a>j+  I exists, it 
follows  from the construction of  a- that a->+  1 ?  aj  1(K,  b') >  aj+  1(K,  b). On the 
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?  aj  (K, b),  and  V(aj_ 1(K,  b), aj(K, b), a>+  1(K,  b), b) = 0  by  construction.  But 
then Lemma 2 implies that V(j1,  aj(K, b), a>+  1(K,  b), b) < 0,  contradicting (31) 
and establishing the Lemma.  Q.E.D. 
LEMMA  5:  If a(K, b) and a(K, b') are two  partial partitions of length K satisfying 
(A) with b >  b' and ao(K, b) =  ao(K, b') = 0, then aI(K, b) =  aI(K, b') implies that 
ai(K,b)  >  ai(K,b') for all i = 2, ...  ,  K. 
Lemma  5  is  an  immediate  consequence  of  Lemma 4  and  assumption  (M). 
Therefore the proof is omitted. 
LEMMA  6:  The maximum  possible equilibrium  partition size, N(b),  is nonincreas- 
ing in b, the difference between agents' preferences. 
PROOF:  Suppose b' <  b. Let a(N(b),  b) be a partition equilibrium of size N(b), 
and  let  a(N(b),  b')  be  the  partial  partition  satisfying  (A)  with  a1(N(b), b') 
= a1(N(b), b). By Lemma 5,  ii(N(b), b') <  ai(N(b), b) for all i = 2, . ..  , N(b).  In 
particular, a(N(b), b') is at least of  length N(b).  It follows  that N(b') 2  N(b). 
Q.E.D. 
We are now ready to generalize the comparative statics results of Section 4. 
THEOREM  3:  For given  preferences (i.e.,  b), R always strictly  prefers equilibrium 
partitions with more steps (larger N's). 
REMARK:  Since R bases his choice of y on rational expectations and F is fixed, 
the Theorem extends the argument of  Section 4 that equilibria with more steps 
are, ceteris paribus, more informative. A similar comment applies to Theorem 4 
below, in connection with changes in b. 
PROOF:  Fix b, and let a(N)  be a partition equilibrium of size N <  N(b).  We 
shall argue that a(N)  can  be  continuously  deformed to  the (unique) partition 
equilibrium of  size N +  1, increasing the expected  utility of  R,  denoted  EUR, 
throughout the deformation. 
Let  ax _  (aox,aIx,  . ..  , a1 + )  be  the  partition  that  satisfies  (A)  for  i = 
2, .. .,  N  with ax = 0,  ax =  x,  and a1+j  =  1. If x = aN-l(N)  then ax =0,  and 
if x = aN(N +  1) then ax = a(N  +  1) and (A)  is satisfied for all i =  1, ...  ,N. 
When x  E  [aN-  (N), aN(N +  1)], which is a nondegenerate interval by Lemma 3, 
EUR(x)  is  strictly increasing in  x.  To  see  this,  note  first  that  V(c, ax, ax, b) 
7  0  for  all  c e[0,  a]  if  xE[aN-  (N), aN(N +  1)).  This  follows  because 
(aN+  (N + 1),  aN+I(N),  . . .,  aN+ (l), aN+  1(0)) is a backward  solution of (A) of 
length N +  1, and (M') guarantees that any other backward solution of (A), a, of 
length N +  1 with ao =  1 and al = x  must satisfy x >  aN+  1(N). Moreover  V(O, 
a,(N  +  1),  a2(N +  1),  b) =  0  by  the  definition  of  a(N  +  1), and  hence  -  V(c, 
a,(N  +  1),  a2(N +  1),  b) > 0  for  all  c E  (0, aI(N +  1)] by  Lemma  2.  It  follows STRATEGIC  INFORMATION  TRANSMISSION  1449 
from the continuity of  V with respect to x  that 
(32)  -  V(c, ax,  aa,  b) _  Us(y(c,  al),  ax, b) -  Us(y(a,  ax),  al  Xb)  > 0 
forall  xE[aN-l(N),aN(N+  1))  and  cE[0,ala. 
Now  EUR(x)  is given by 
N+  1 
(33)  EUR(X) 
=  E  ajx UR(y(ax_  1,  ajx) m)f(m)  dm 
j=1  9i 
Since y(ajx 1,ajx), defined  in  (9)  as  R's  best  response  to  a  signal  in  the  step 
[ajx 1,ajxI,  maximizes the jth  term in the sum and since a1+-  1, the Envelope 
Theorem yields 
dEUR(X)  N  dajxu 
(34)  dx  -  f(ax)  d  [UR(y (ax,  ajx),  ajx) 
- uR(y(ajx,  ajx+  1),  aj)]. 
Assumption (M) guarantees that dajx/dx > 0  for all]  =  1, ... .,N,  and 
(35)  UR(y(aAx,  ax)  ax)  -  UR(y(ax  Wax+  x)  aX) 
?  Us(y(ajx  1, ajx)  ajx,  b)  -  Us(y(ajx,  aj+  ), ajx, b) 
(j=  1, ...N) 
The  first inequality in  (35)  holds  because y(ajx,  ajx) <y(ajX,  ax+)  and  Us ( .) 
>  0;  the  second  inequality  is  an  equality  for  j  =  2,  . ..  , N  by  (A)  and  the 
definition  of  ax,  and  holds  strictly  for j  =  1  by  (32).  This  establishes  the 
Theorem.  Q.E.D. 
THEOREM  4:  For  a  given  number of  steps  (i.e.,  N),  R  always prefers  thle 
equilibrium  partition associated with more similar preferences (i.e.,  a smaller value 
of b). 
The proof of Theorem 4 is a straightforward application of Lemma 5 and an 
argument like that used to prove Theorem 3, and is therefore omitted. 
THEOREM  5:  For given preferences (i.e.,  b),  S  always strictly prefers ex  ante 
(that is, before learning  his type) equilibrium  partitions with more steps (larger N's). 
PROOF:  Maintaining the notation used in the proof of Theorem 3, 
N+  1 
(36)  EUs(x)  =  f  raj  Us(y(ajx  1,  ajx) m, b)f(m)  dm. 
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It follows that 
dEUS(X)  N  dax 
(37)  dx  -2f(aJ)  dx  [Us(y(ajx  A,ajx),ajx,b) 
-  Us(y(ajx  , aj+ 1)  ajx,  b)] 
N+  I 
fd- 
(aj  ,  a 
+  E  d(a  J)  raxU(y(ajx  1,ajx),m,b)f(m)dm. 
The  first term on  the right-hand side of  (37) is positive by  (A),  (32),  and  the 
definition of ax.  The second  term is nonnegative  since dy(ajx  , ajx)/dx  > 0 by 
(M),  and  the integral expressions are all nonnegative  by  our assumption that 
Us3(-) > 0 and by the first-order conditions that determine R's optimal choice of 
they(axI,  ajx).  Q.E.D. 
6.  CONCLUSION 
This  paper  represents  an  attempt  to  characterize  rational  behavior  in 
interactive two-person situations where direct communication between agents is a 
possibility.  While  we  have  considered  explicitly  only  a  small  subset  of  the 
universe of  possible  models  with  this property, our results can  be  generalized 
immediately beyond the confines of our model in several directions. These results 
hint that there may be a good case for presuming that direct communication is 
more likely to play an important role, the more closely related are agents' goals. 
Other interesting conclusions suggested by our theory are that perfect communi- 
cation  is  not  to  be  expected  in  general  unless  agents'  interests  completely 
coincide,  and  that once  interests diverge by  a given, "finite" amount, only  no 
communication is consistent with rational behavior. 
Some worthwhile extensions of  the model  are suggested by the fact that the 
structure of our model interacts with the rational-expectations character of  our 
solution concept in such a way that concepts like lying, credibility, and credulity 
-all  essential features of  strategic communication-do  not have fully satisfac- 
tory operational meanings within the model. Generalizations that would test the 
robustness of our results and help to remedy this defect include allowing lying to 
have costs for S, uncertain to R, in addition to those inherent in its effect on R's 
choice of action; allowing R to be uncertain about S's preferences, and therefore 
about his incentives to communicate truthfully; and allowing S  to be uncertain 
about R's ability to check the accuracy of what he is told. 
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